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in the present paper which is based on a recently published study. (Carlsson, Bergholm, Lindberg, 1981 .)2
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents a brief discussion of industrial subsidies as an element of industrial policy in general and distinguishes between general and specific subsidies. Section 3 gives an overview of the magnitude and orientation of the Swedish industry subsidy program in the 1970s.
In section 4, an attempt is made to make an international comparison of industrial subsidy programs. The comparison is limited to a numer ical description of the size and character of subsidy programs in various countries; no attempt is made to evaluate the performance or degree of success. Section 5 turns to a description of the selective subsidies given to certain industrial firms in Sweden during the 1970s, and section 6 investigates the macroeconomic effects of these firm-specific subsidies. Section 7 presents a summary and some concluding remarks.
Industrial Subsidies -An Element of Industrial Policy
Government' policy regarding industr ial subsidies is but one element of what may loosely be referred to as industrial Dolicy. Without going into the thorny question of how "industriai policy" is or should be defined, it is clear that the objectives of such policies var y greatly among countries and therefore also the means used to achieve those ends. It is also clear that, in addition to industriai subsidies, among the elements constituting industrial Dolicy in various countries, the following are usually to be found, in varying degrees: (1) tariff policy and other forms of proteetion;
(2) direct government ownership of means of production; (3) eco--3 -nomic planning at the nationallevel; (4) manpower policy broadly defined; (5) regional policy; (6) government procurement policy; and (7) policies regarding research, development and technical traininge Thus, it is obvious that any attempt to evaluate the policies and performance of a given country as regards industrial subsidies is bound to give only apartial picture of the country's overall performance in industrial policy in general. The role of industrial subsidies in overall industrial policyaiso varies)
Restricting ourselves henceforth to considering industrial subsidies, it is useful to distinguish between general subsidy schemes and specific schemes. General subsidies are those schemes under which the subsidy is given under certain standard rules of procedure to determine the eligibility of applicants and within those rules is available to all comers. On the other hand, specific or tailor-made subsidies are given to particular persons or firms for a particular purpose. (Whiting, 1976, p. l.) Examples of general subsidies would be tax deductions for investments of a particular type or in a particular region, grants or tax deductions for research and development expenditures, or loans offer ed below market rates to small and medium size firms.
Specific subsidies typically involve support for a specific project or product or for the restructuring or re-equipment of a firm.
The philosophy behind general subsidies is that their availability and value are readily calculable by firms, who can therefore take them into account in planning their activities. They are also relatively straightforward, quick and cheap to operate (ibid., p. 2).
Specific subsidies, on the other hand, involve more discretion and more top-Ievel decision making on the part of the government, and the results are much less predictable and calculable.
For these reasons, industrial subsidies have tended to be of the general rather than the specific kind in the countries investigated here. However, in the face of the severe structural adjustment problems that arose during the 1970's the emphasis seems to have shifted significantly towards mor e specific policies.
-4 -
Magnitude and Orientation of the Swedish Industry Subsidy Program
Sweden provides a good example of this shlft in emphasis from general to speclfic schemes during the 1970's. Structural adjustment policy has played an important role in the Swedish economy since the 1950's. The princ;ipal means has been la bor market policy which has been designed to alleviate the continupus adjustment generated by the pressures of international competition.
Thus, Sweden's labor market policy can be seen as a complement to the country's extensive sodal welfare programs. But in addition, the "solidaric wage policy" favored by the Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) has actually reinforced the adjustment need by putting increased pressure on low-wage, low productivity firms.
This philosophy of the complementary role of adjustment policy and the roi e of labor union wage policy originated in the socalle d Rehn model of economic policy in Sweden which was developed in the early 1950's by LO economists and which placed considerable emphasis on the need for active intervention by government in the labor market (OECD, 1980, p. 189) .4
However, in the face of the extremely large structural adjustments necessitated by the developments, both international and domestic, in the wake of the first oil crisis, it was widely felt that labor market policy alone was inadequate to deal with the situation, and the political pressure to intervene more directly mounted. The means chosen was dramatically increased selective subsidies to ailing firms and industries.
The changing structure and magnitude of the Swedish industrial subsidy program in the course of the 1970's is reflected in Figure 1 .
There it can be seen that the industrial subsidies rose from a modest 1.3 96 of GDP (or 4.9 96 of value added in mining and manufacturing) in 1970 to an extraordinary 3.6 96 of GDP (16 96 of V. A. in mining and manufacturing) in 1978 (production valued at market prices), declining somewhat in 1979. Virtually the whole -5 -increase can be attributed to an increase in firm specific subsidies of a very selective kind; these grew from practically zero to a peak of 2.0 96 of GDP in 1978.
The Swedish subsidy figures presented in this paper (including those in Figure 1 ) refer to amounts actually paid out andinclude both grants and loans. The reason why no distinction is made here between grants and lo ans is primarily that it is of ten difficult to draw the line between them, as e.g. 'in the case of socalle d copqitional loa~~. It is cOfTlmon also in other cases that soft lpans are converted into grants. As indicated in Table A First of all, it must be stated at the outset that collecting data on government subsldies is a difficult, if not impossible. task.
The virtual absence of international comparative studies on thls topic testifies to this. Data on government subsidies is one type of information which most governments ace not eager to divulge -9 -or whose diffusion they sometimes actively prevent. The transparency, and thus the quality, of the data we have been able to obtain, therefore, varies a great deal from one country to another. Accordingly, the figures presente d here represent only a first attempt to pull together information which has been made available to us and must be interpreted with extreme care. For example, there are some glaring omissions in the data we have obtained; the institutionai arrangements vary greatly, particularly with regard to the tax system, and it is therefore difficult to classify certain measures under any given heading. Also. in some countries, such as e.g. France and Germany, tax exemptions playan imDortant role as a supplement to direct subsidies. However, the impact and magnitude of tax exemptions obviously depend on the characteristics of the tax system, the study of which would take us too far afield. Therefore, except in the German case, we have tried to exclude tax exemptions and included only paid-out or appropriated amounts.7 The reasons why tax exemptions in Germany are treated differently from those in other countries are (1) that they seem to be much more specific than those, e.g., in the Scandinavian countries and therefore play a role very similar to that of direct subsidies in these countries; (2) that the German government itself obviously views the se tax exemptions as being very simUar to direct subsidies ; and (3) that estimates of the (gross) cost to the government's budget of tax exemptions are available for Germany but not for other countries.
Secondly, it should be pointed out again that the degree to which government industrial policy relies on subsidies varies among countries. As indicated in section 2, industrial subsidies constitute but one aspect of industrial policy. This means, more specifically, e.g., that the role of indirect subsidies in the form of government procurement arrangements and rules as well as that of trade barders protecting domestic firms may vary substantially among countries. Such effects are not considered here.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the aim in presenting this comparison is neither to evaluate indivldual governments' subsidy -10 -programs, nor to assess the role of subsldles in overall adjustment policies. The goal is rather more modest, namely to get a rough idea of the magnitude and orientatlon of such subsidy programs in various countries, and to find out to what extent they differ.
Being aware of all these limitations, let us turn now to the infor:-mation at hand, summarized in Table l ever, since most export subsidies are given in the form of loans for whlch the actual subsidyelement and the institutionai arrangements vary a great deal, the large differences here probably mostly reflect the poor quality or at least poor comparability of the data. General investment and employment subsidies see m to be relatively unimportant. Under the heading "employment subsidies to firms" we have tried to include only anticyclical measures aimed at firms, as well as labor market subsldies available not just to firms in acute difficulties. 8
It should be pointed out, of course, that the classification of certain types of subsidy schemes is wrought with many problems. Sources to Table 1 ..
Great Britain: Public Expenditure White. Paper (March 1981), t'aole '2.4. I would like to thank professor Robert M. Grant, The City University Business School, London, for furnishing me with these data and for helpful suggestions for classification of the data.
~tal~: Bank of Italy (1978) ; Istituto Centrale di Statistica 1978). I am indebted to professor Alfredo Del Monte, University of Naples, for collecting and furnishing me with these data.
According to calculations made by prof. Del Monte, the financial cost to the government budget of the industry subsidy program (calculated as the difference between the market rate at which the government borrows and the favorable rate on the loans offered under the available schemes times the amount of loans outstanding, plus capital grants given during the year) amounted to 1 375 billion lire in 1978.
Norway : Industrifondet, 1980a and 1980b. n .
Sweden: Data from Industristödsutredningen (Government Committee on Industrial Subsidies) as reported in Carlsson, Bergholm, Lindberg (1981) .
W~st German):': Deutscher Bundestag (1979) (7th ~ubsid):'· R~-2ort); Sjöström and Olofsson (1981) .
The German figures were obtained in the following way. The basic source for the allocation of various support programs to the types of programs in Table 1 is the 7th. Supsid):' Report.
From the total figure for Federal financial support of the industrial sector given in that Report (4 006 million DM 1980), support programs for energy and· raw material acquisition were excluded. To the remaining Federal financial support of 3 618 million DM were added an estimated 2 000 million DM in state and local aid, and 2 039 million DM in ERP (= European Recovery Program) measures, all of which were classified as "regional and small firm support". The total tax exemption figure for the industrial sector given in the 7th. SUbSidi Report is 9 802 million DM (4 616 Federal aid and 5 186 mi Ilon DM state and local). However, after excluding certain measures applying to the financial sector and certain programs relating to the housing sector, the remaining tax exemption total is 9 184 million DM.
In addition, based on Sjöström and Olofsson (1981) perceived to be of a rather different, "rescue type" character, are regarded as sectoral subsidies. In some countries, support of the steel industry has been industry-wide, while in others it has been firm specific. Therefore, it has been judged more useful to distinguish between "rescue operations" and other types of industrial subsidies than to try to differentiate between industry-wide and firm specific subsidies to, say, the steel industry. Hence the division into "rescue operations" (rather than "specific subsidies") and "general subsidies" in Table l. What is left, then, under "rescue operations" is principallv support of ailing firms and industries. But because of lack of sufficiently detailed data, it is possible that there are som e other elements also included here. The sector composition varies greatly:
two-thirds of the rescue operations in Germany are directed toward the coal mining industry, which is also a large receiver in Britain, along with autos, shipbuilding and steel. In Norway, about one-half of the rescue operations involve the shipbuilding industry. In Sweden, as we will see in more detail below, threefourths of this type of selective measures are directed toward shipbuilding and steel. It has not been possible to determine the distribution by sector in Italy.
It appears from the in the shipbuilding industry --i.e., inputs in the production process were worth more when they arrived at the shipyards than they were when they left in the form of newly built ships (Hamilton, 1981, pp. 8-9 )! In the steel industry and the mining industry, the subsidies corresponded to 30-40 % of the wage bill or about 100 000 Skr per employee for the three-year period as a whole.
Since nearly all of the steel subsidies have gone to the commercial steel sector, which represents one-third of total employment -1.5 - The following comparisons may be helpful in getting an idea of the magnitude of the subsidies given to crisis-stricken firms:
--------------------.-..-_---------------------------

_------------------------------------------
-Government revenue in the form of corporate income tax 1970-79 amounted to 13.8 billion Skr --i.e., about one-half of firm-specific subsidies during the same period.
-During the period 1977-79, the total industrial subsidies (both general and specific) were somewhat larger than the total appropriations for national defense. At the same time, the firm specific subsidies corresponded to one-half of the payroll tax paid by all industrial firms.
-During the same period , the firm specific subsidies corresponded to 2 500 Skr (about US$ 500) per individual in Sweden or about 5 000 Skr (US$ 1000) per person employed in the whole economy. Nearly half of this went to the shipyards.
Macro-Economic Effects of Firm-Specific Subsidies
What, then, has been the macro-economic impact of the firm-specific subsidies? In order to answer that question one needs to specif Y some alternatives to which the implemented policy can be compared. This can be done with the aid of a model. A model can also be used as an analytical tool in trying to understand the basic mechanisms at work in various policy alternatives. As an alternative to the extremely selective actual subsidy program (support given to specific firms in specific circumstances)
we have specified a mor e general alternative, namely where subsidies are given to all firms as a percentage reduction of their total wage bill in proportion to the rate at which they increased -19 -their exports in the preceding quarter. This is referred to as the export subsidy case. It should be noted that support is not necessarily given to the largest exporters or to the firms with the largest export share but rather to those which increase their exports at the highest rate.
An even more general alternative is to give wage subsidies to all manufacturing firms in proportion to their wage bill during the same period as the selective subsidy. This can be regarded as either a (temporary) s.eneral wage subsidy or a (temporary) reduce~ ~oll ~. It turns out that in order to reach the same magnitude as the actual subsidies, the general wage subsidy would have to be about 10 96. Alternatively, the payroll tax would have to be reduced from about 40 96 to about 20 96 of the total wage bill.
In summary, the subsidyexperiments can be described in the following way. We have studied the macro-economic impact of a temporary stimulus in the form of wage subsidies to ei ther a) a group of non-competitive flrms, b) a group of rapidly growing export oriented firms, or c) all manufacturing firms, all other things being equal.
As a contrast to subsidy policies with varying degrees of selectivity we have also constructed a laissez-faire case in which no measure is taken, i.e. no subsldies are given at all. In this case, there is of course no need to finance a subsidy program; therefore there is no need for an income tax increase ei ther .11
Through the selective subsidies, the recipient firms survive in the simulation at least until the subsidies begin to be phased out in 1983. In 1983-84 in this simulation, one of the forest based firms as weIl as the commerdal steel fkm and the shipyards are closed down. The other recipient firm in the forest based industry is closed down in 1988 and one of the textile firms in 1990. The other textile and apparel "firms" survlve throughout the whole simulation.
-20 -But what happens if these firms are not subsidized? In the laissez-faire case, the largest among them (the shipyards, the commerdal steel and the two for est based firms) are eliminated during the first few years of the simulation, while the textile and apparel firms are phased out more gradually. P,ut even in the cases when the selective subsidies are replaced by more general subsidies, the shipyards, steel and forest firms are forced to close down rather quickly. In the export subsidy case, the textile firms abo gradually faU, but in the general subsidy (reduced payroll) case, three of the four textile "firms" survive throughout the simulation.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that it would have been difficult to maintain employment in the crisis-stricken firms, or even to prevent these firms from failing, without direct subsidi-
es. But what are the more general effects of these selective polides? What, e.g., would have happened to unemployment in the longer run?
As shown in Figure 2a , closing down several of the ailing firms at the beginning of the period would have led to considerable unemployment for a few years at the end of the 1970's. However, the additional unemployment would have been smaller than the number of people employed initially in the dosed-down firms, because approximately one-third as many jobs would have been created elsewhere in the manufacturing sector during the tirst couple of years. i2
One of the main reasons for this result is that when the wages in non-competitive firms are subsidized, these firms maintain their employment. Non-subsidized firms therefore have to raise their wage offers in order to be able to recruit people from either the subsidized fkms or the unemployment pool (whkh is reduced l>ecause of the subsidies). This causes generally higher wages, lower profits in non-subsidized firms, and therefore fewer incentives for expansion. The result is that the adjustment to The basic reason why the unemployment rate becomes substantially higher during the first half of the 80's in the selective subsidy case than in the other cases is that when the subsidies are phased out, most of the recipient firms faH. In order to rescue them permanently, the subsidies would either have had to be larger or be continued for a longer period than we assumed. Thus, in our simulations the effect of the subsidies as far as unemployment is concerned is largely to delay unemployment and hold back expansion outside the subsidized firms.
Of course, in the absence of direct subsidies to crisis-~tricken firms, industrial production would have been lower for a few years but would then have been higher for the rest of the sim ulated period af ter the subsidies are phased out, for reasons similar to those given above. See Figure 2b . This conelusion does not hold for the laissez-faire case, however. In that case, the production lost during the subsidy period is not made up later.
It is worth noting that even if subsidies had been given of the same order of magnitude but of a less selective type, it would have taken some time before industrial production started to -23 -Nevertheless, the level of industr ial production after 1983 is substantially higher and grows faster in the general wage subsidy (reduced payroU) case than in the selective subsidy case. 13
If direct subsidies had not been given to the ailing firms, the balance of trade would also have suffered a relative dec1ine during the first few years. See Figure 2c . This is due to the fact that several of the firms receiving subsidies, e.g. the shipyards, are large exporters. Therefore, when the subsidies are phased out and several of the subsidized firms c10se down, the trade balance suffers. After the elimination of the subsidies, the more general subsidy policies turn out to yield a more positive trade balance than the selective policy. Again, the laissez-faire policy turns out to perform less weIl. Looking over the entire simulated period, both export subsidies and a gen~ral wage subsidy (reduced payroll tax) are c1early more favorable as regards the trade balance than the selecti ve policy.
However, as far as private consumption is concerned (see Figure  2d ), the selective wage subsidy policy may be said to yield the most favorable development over the simulated period as a who le and especially during the period of the subsidy program. This indica tes that direct subsidies to crisis-stricken firms is a more effective means of maintaining capacity utilization and therefore also private consumption than the other policy alternatives. On the other hand, as just pointed out, these other alternatives are more successful in improving the trade balance.
An alternative policy might have been to impose tariffs or import quotas in the stricken industries. However, such a policy has not been investigated because import restrictions would not be of much use in these heavily export oriented industries and have never been contempiated in the Swedish debate. Roughly 3/4 of the output of Swedish shipyards and 2/3 of the output of forest products is exported. Even prohibitive tariffs on imports would not guarantee a large enough domestic market for the sick firms -24 -in these industries to survive. AIso, such tariffs would violate GA TT rules and would run counter to the whole post war development. It is likely that the distortions resulting from such a policy would have been even worse than those resulting from subsidies because import restrictions would have led to both lower domestic consumption (through higher prices) and higher costs to using sectors, as well as a homemarket bias (see Corden and Fels (1976) , pp. 215-222) detrimental in the long run to the international competitiveness of Swedish industry. In other words, the negative impact on firms' incentives seem likely to be greater when tariffs are imposed than when subsidies are used -but this is clearly a question for future research.
Summary and Conclusions
Summing up, if we tirst confine the discussion to the stated objectives of the subsidy program, it is quite clear that in terms of the tirst objective, that of preventing or delaying unacceptable reductions of employment, the selective wage subsidies have favorable short-run effects relative to all other alternatives investigated here. But in the longer run, this policy performs worse than the other alternatives (except the laissez-faire case) even in pure employment terms. And in terms of the second objective, that of facilitating re-structuring, this policy is worse than both export subsidies and general wage subsidies.
If we broaden the evaluation to include more than just employment effects, the conclusions are rather similar • The selective wage subsidy yields higher industrial production and exports during the first few years than the alternative policies investigated, because the subsidized firms, most of which are heavilv export oriented, do not fall like in the other policy alternatives. However, both export subsidies and general wage subsidies lead to more favorable long-term effects on industrial production as well as trade performance (and unemployment). In comparison with these alternatives, therefore, the selective subsidy program yields negative long-run effects.
-25 -Compared to the laissez-faire case, the effo:>cts of the selective policies are very favorable in the short run and yet not particularly costly in the long rune The virtual absence of long-term (allocative) effects in the selective relative to the laissez-faire case is explained by several circumstances: (1) that the subsidies are actually phased out after eight years and that the firms which fail the n are allowed to elose down; and (2) that the subsidies are limited and non-negotiable. The recipient firms receive "only" a certain percentage of their total wage bill --even though this percentage is very high in some cases. They are not allowed to negotiate for more subsidies. Therefore, their incentives are not destroyed. It is not likely that such constraints apply in the real world. In other words, it is likely that the negative longrun effects of the selective subsidy policy relative to the laissezfaire policy are underestimated. However, a laissez-faire policy seems neither politically attractive nor economically or socially desirable, based on the results of our investigation.
It should perhaps also be pointed out that the whole issue of how subsidies affect the incentives of firms has not been dealt with adequately in this study. While using a micro-based model for the analysis offers considerable advantages compared to conventionai macro modeis, the question of incentives within firms has been handled here only by assumption. Thus, here remains an important topic for further research.
A comparison of the development of industrial production in the various policy alternatives shows that the selective policy gives an immediate stimulus while more general measures take longer before they yield results; on the other hand, the long-term results are much more favorable. Expressed differently, a dosage of temporary wage subsidies to all manufacturing firms yields mor e favorable long-term effects than a similarly large dosage of temporary subsidies to non-competitive firms. However, as far as the short-run effects are concerned, the reverse is true, since the non-competitive firms would have failed without subsidies and their production, exports, and employment would have been lost.
-26 -Thus, our study sheds light on some of the issues involved in industrial policy making. The results show that it is difficult, if not im possible , to both prevent unemployment in the short run and facilitate re-structuring with one single policy. They bring out the differences in the consequences of selective and general policies. And they illuminate the confliet between short-run and long-run policies. There is little doubt that the political choiees made in Sweden in the lat ter part of the 1970's concerning adjustment policy have involved highly selective, short-run policies. These policies have undoubtedly allowed Sweden to escape in the short run from certain adjustment problems at the cost of delayed adjustment and slower future growth. The question is how long it will take to reverse these policies, and how much permanent damage will have been done in the process. The problem for the future is exacerbated by the fact that Sweden's subsidy program appears to have been both considerably larger in terms of industrial output and more heavily oriented towards rescue operations than those in other European countries, creating greater destruction of incentives and contributing to greater uncertainty for firms' decision making in Sweden than elsewhere.
-27 -Footnotes l According to the Directives given to the Government Committee on Industr ial Subsidies.
2 The study was commissioned and financed by the Government Committee on Industrial Subsidies (Industristödsutredningen).
Financial support in the form of computer time provided by Industri~konomisk Institutt, Bergen, Norway, is also gratefully acknowledged.
3 In addition to these industrial policies, most countries pursue with varying vigor policies to maintain competition and efficiency and to fight collusion and monopoly.
obtained from 'tJie ~rench Ministry of Budget. The total figure for industrial subsidies is approximately 26 billion francs, corresponding to 1.1 96 of GDP and 3.9 96 of value added in mining and manufacturing. Over 70 96 of these subsidies were classified as "rescue operations". Thus, the French subsidies appear to be of the same general magnitude as those in Britain and Germany, but they also appear to be much more selective in nature.
9 The shipyards also received some "general subsidies", but their share of total subsidies was considerably smaller than their share of firm specific subsidies. For ii more detailed analysis of the subsidies to the shipbuilding industry, see Hamilton (1981) .
10 The model, which is named MOSES, has been described in several publications, especially in Eliasson (1978) . A brief presentation of the model with special application to the present subsidy simulations is found in Carlsson-Bergholm-Lindberg, (1981) 11 Yet another case of selective subsidies to ailing firms but on conditions that differ from those in the selective subsidy case mentioned above has also been examined but is not reported on here for reasons of brevity and darity of exposition.
12 Public sector employment is assumed to be the same in all of the simulations.
13 The fact that the dedine in industrial production is smaller in the laissez-faire case relative to the selective policy alternative than that in the other policy cases is explained by 1) the fact that there is no income tax raise suppressing total demand, and 2) the fact that general subsidies are relatively powerless in the poor cydical conditions during the first few years of the simulation.
-29 -APPENDIX l. The model is oriented mainly toward analyzing industrial !2'rowth. Therefore, the manufacturing sector is the most detailed in the model. Manufacturing is divided in to four industries (raw material processing, semi-manufactures, durable goods manufacturing, and manufacture of consumer nondurables). Each industry consists of a number of firms, some of which are real (with data supplied mainly through an annual survey) and some of which are synthetic. Together, the synthetic firms in each industry make up the differences between the real firms and the industry totals in the national accounts. The 147 real firns (including the eight "crisisstricken firms" --see next paragraph) in the model cover 70-75 % of industrial employment and production in the base year, 1976. The model is based on quarterly data.
In addition to the real firms which are normaliv included in the data base, certain "crisis-stricken firms" have been added in the present runs: two forest-based firms (Södra Skogsä!2'arnas Cellulosa AB and NCB), the consolidated company formed by merging the three large Swedish commerdal steel firms in 1977 (Svenskt Stål AB), the consol~dated Swedish shipyards (Svenska Varv), and four textile and apparei "firms", each representing a subsector -31 -within that indutry. Together, these firms received the great bulk of industrial subsidies during the 1970's, with the exception of the iron ore mines. The mining sector is outside manufacturing in MOSES and is therefore not analyzed here.
Firms in the model constitute short and long run planning systems for production and investment. Each quarter they dedde on their desired production, employment and investment. Armed with these plans the y go into the labor market where their employment plans confront those of other firms as well as labor supply.
The labor force is treated as homogeneous in the model, i.e. labor is recruited from a common "pool". However, labor can also be recruited from other firms. This process determines the wage level, which is thus endogenous in the model. Even though the labor market is homogeneous, wages vary among both firms and industries without any tendency to converge. Since the labor market is not subdivided into industries or regions, mobility in the labor market is probably overestimated. This is important in interpreting the results.
Domestic product prices and the production volume in the four product markets are determi[)ed through a similar process. The export volume is determined endogenously in the follnwing way.
Each quarter the firms determine their production volume in two steps. First, the y determine their desired production volume, taking into account desired changes in their inventories of finished goods, based on their expected total sales (inc1uding exports) which are in turn based on the firms' historical experience. This first production plan is revised by the firms with regard to profit targets, capadty utilization, and the expected labor market situation. After this revision, the production plan is executed. The production volume is distributed to the export and domestic markets according to an export share which is dependent on that for the previous quarter but which also depends on the difference during the previous quarter between the export price and the domestic -32 -price. If this export price (which is exogenous) was higher than the domestic price, the firms try to increase their export share during the present quarter. However, the adjustment takes place over several quarters, not instantly. If the export price is lower than the domestic price, the firms do not try to lower their export share but rather maintain it at a constant level. In spite of this assymetry concerning the effect of positive or negative price differences between exports and the domestic market, i t turns out that the export shares in the various markets can both increase and decrease. This depends on whether firms with high export shares fare better or worse than other firms in the market.
The import share in the four markets is also determied by the difference between the export and domestic prices with a certain time delay. High domestic prices relative to foreign prices lead to increasing import shares.
Since the adjustment of both export and import shares takes place over several quarters, price differences between the domestic and export markets can arlse and last for several years. This is a source of cycles in the model: if the export price exceeds the domestic price, firms try to increase their exports. Since the y are always able to sell their export supply at the going (exogenous) export price, this provides stimulus to the firms. However, the stimulus is limited by the fact that the price difference between the domestic and export market has been constrained to +-2 %. This causes the export and import shares to be relatively stable. As far as exports are concerned, this is not too surprlsing, since the export prices have been assumed to change smoothly. But there is considerable turbulence on the import side in these runs which arises when certain large firms are not able to reach their profit target and use up thelr equity capital so that they are forced to close down. This causes a loss of supply which leads to a price rise in the domestic market. Since the price differential has been constrained to be less than 2 %, and since the change in the import share is not instantaneous, only ~ of the -33 -supply loss is replaced with increased domestic production in other firms and with increased imports. In order to satisfy domestic demand in spite of this, temporary "extra imports'~ are allowed which do not affect the "regular" import share and which remain until domestic demand can be satisfied through domestic production and "regular " imports.
There is also a capital market in the model where firms compete for investment resources and where the rate of interest is deternined. However, in the present runs the rate of interest has been determined exogenously. At this given interest rate firms lnvest as much as the y flnd it profitable to invest, given their profit targets. The absence of competition among firms for capital causes the effect of subsidies on investment to be mor e favorable than would otherwise be the case.
The public sector is treated in the following way. Public sector employment is determined exogenously, and the rate of wage increase in the public sector has been set equal to the average wage change in manufacturing. Therefore, the public sector can be said to be neutralized in these runs. The reason for neutralizing this block in the model is that it simplifies the analysis of the industrial development. Thus, public sector employment is the same regardless of the size and direction of subsidies.
The exogenous variables which drive the model are the rate of technical change (which is, spedfic to each sector and raises the labor productivity assodated with new, best practice investment) and the rate of change of prices in the export markets. The rates of change of these variables are identical in all runs reported here.
In contrast to most econometric macro modeis, domestic prices and wages are determined endogenously in MOSES. These in turn influence the firms' profits and therefore their production plans, the allocation of sales to the domestic and export markets, their -34 -investments, and therefore their productivity. This is the main mechanism through which resource allocation is determined in the model. These features make the model especially suited for analyzing the effects of policy measures which can be expected to influence the expectations and plans of firms and which influence the development of prices and wages. The advantage of a microbased simulation model is that one can introduce various policy measures affecting individual firms rather than industries and analyze the effects. In a more traditional macro modelone is usually forced to make assumptions regarding the resource allocation effects, i.e. one has to assume a large portion of the results.
